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Abstract— A new game theoretical solution concept for open 
spectrum sharing in cognitive radio (CR) environments is 
presented – the Lorenz equilibrium (LE). Both Nash and Pareto 
solution concepts have limitations when applied to real world 
problems. Nash equilibrium (NE) rarely ensures maximal payoff 
and it is frequently Pareto inefficient. The Pareto set is usually a 
large set of solutions, often too hard to process. The Lorenz 
equilibrium is a subset of Pareto efficient solutions that are 
equitable for all players and ensures a higher payoff than the 
Nash equilibrium. LE induces a selection criterion of NE, when 
several are present in a game (e.g. many-player discrete games) 
and when fairness is an issue. Besides being an effective NE 
selection criterion, the LE is an interesting game theoretical 
situation per se, useful for CR interaction analysis. 
Keywords - open spectrum sharing, cognitive radio 
environments, spectrum-aware communications, non-cooperative 
one-shot games, Lorenz equilibrium, Nash equilibrium selection, 
fairness, Pareto efficiency. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The problem of finding an appealing solution concept for 
Open Spectrum Sharing (OSS) is addressed from a game 
theoretical perspective. Lorenz equilibrium (LE) [1] ensures a 
set of equitable Pareto optimal strategies [2] and a 
technique/criterion for selecting a Nash equilibrium (NE) when 
many are present. 
OSS refers to spectrum sharing among secondary users 
(cognitive radios) in unlicensed spectrum bands [3]. Cognitive 
radio (CR) interactions are strategic interactions [4], [5]: the 
utility of one CR depends on the actions of all the other CRs in 
the environment. Game Theory (GT) provides a fertile 
framework and the tools for CR interaction analysis [4], [6], 
[7], [8], [9], [12], [13]. Insight may be gained on unanticipated 
situations that may arise in spectrum sharing, by devising GT 
simulations.  
This paper tries to answer the question “Can we go beyond 
a Nash equilibrium?” [4] in one-shot spectrum sharing games. 
Usually, the outcome of a non-cooperative game is the Nash 
equilibrium - the most common solution concept. In OSS 
fairness is an issue [4], [12], [13] and usually, NE does not 
provide it.  
Standard GT analysis of spectrum sharing is performed 
based on the continuous forms of the games. Yet, discrete 
modeling seems more realistic for spectrum access as users get 
to choose discrete quantities of the radio resources (number of 
channels, power levels, etc.). Discrete GT models usually yield 
multiple Nash equilibria. The number of NEa increases with 
the number of users.  Equilibrium selection thus becomes an 
issue. 
The basic assumptions of our approach are: (i) CRs are 
modelled as myopic, self-regarding players, (ii) CRs do not 
know in advance what actions the other CRs will choose, (iii) 
repeated interaction among the same CRs is not likely to occur 
on a regular basis [11], and (iv) CRs have perfect channel 
sensing and RF reconfiguration capabilities [9], [10]. Given 
these assumptions, one-shot, non-cooperative, discrete game 
analysis is considered relevant.  
A well known game theoretical model – Cournot oligopoly 
[5] – is chosen as support for simulation, due to its simple and 
intuitive form and suitability for resource access modelling. 
Although it has been intensively used for spectrum trading 
modelling, the Cournot model has also been reformulated in 
terms of spectrum access [6], [12], [14] capturing general 
scenarios.  
Considering the limitations of Nash and Pareto equilibria, a 
new solution concept is considered - the Lorenz equilibrium (a 
subset of Pareto optimal strategies). The Lorenz solution 
concept is a transformation that is applied to the payoffs 
(outcomes) of the game. It is suitable for both centralized and 
decentralized approaches to spectrum sharing. As Lorenz 
equilibrium is both equitable and Pareto efficient, it induces a 
NE selection criterion. Besides being an effective NE selection 
criterion, the LE is an interesting GT situation per se. 
Numerical simulations reveal equilibrium situations that 
may be reached in simultaneous, open spectrum access 
scenarios. Lorenz equilibrium is detected and analyzed along 
with four other types of equilibria. Besides Nash and Pareto, 
new equilibrium situations establish, especially for n-player 
interactions. Heterogeneity of players is captured by joint 
Nash-Pareto equilibrium allowing CRs to exhibit different 
types of rationality [14].  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II 
formally describes the Lorenz equilibrium. LE properties are 
discussed in Section III. Section IV introduces the LE 
generative relation as a basis for LE detection. Section V 
presents a general open spectrum access scenario for which the 
main equilibria are detected. Numerical simulations and results 
are discussed in Section VI. Section VII concludes our paper. 
This paper was supported by CNCSIS –UEFISCDI, Romania, project TE 
252/2010-2013.  
II. LORENZ EQUILIBRIUM  
Generally, a game is defined as a system G = (N, Ai, ui, i = 
1,…, n) [5] where: 
(i) N represents the set of n players, N = {1,…, n}. 
(ii) for each player i є N, Ai represents the set of actions Ai = 
{ai1, ai2, …, aim}; nAAAA ...21  is the set of all 
possible game situations; 
(iii) for each player i є N, ui : A → R represents the utility 
function (payoff). 
A strategy profile is a vector ,),...,( 1 Aaaa n   where 
ii Aa  is an action of player i.  
By ),( *ii aa   we denote the strategy profile obtained from 
a
* 
by replacing the action of player i with ai, i.e. 
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A strategy profile is said to be a Nash equilibrium if no 
player can improve her payoff by unilateral deviation [5]. 
Lorenz equilibrium is a new GT solution concept [1]. This 
solution concept is inspired by multicriteria optimization 
(MCO) where it is known as Lorenz dominance (LD) [15], or 
equitable dominance relation.  
The standard solution concept in MCO is the Pareto set. A 
refinement of the Pareto dominance, LD is used in decision 
theory and fair optimization problems. The set of equitable 
efficient solutions is contained within the set of efficient 
solutions (Pareto). In GT, informally, the Pareto optimality (or 
Pareto efficiency) is a strategy profile so that no strategy can 
increase one player’s payoff without decreasing any other 
player’s payoff [2], [15]. 
In addition to the initial objective aiming at maximizing 
individual utilities, fairness refers to the idea of favoring well-
balanced strategies [15]. Therefore, in fair optimization 
problems, we are interested in working with a preference 
relation ≽ satisfying the following axioms: 
 
(1) P-Monotonicity: For all           
 
                ≽    
         ≽                    (1) 
and                                                                                  
                     
                ,            (2) 
 
where ≽P      is the Pareto (Pareto strict) dominance relation 
[15]. 
 
(2) Impartiality: While dealing with uniform criteria, we 
want to focus on the distribution of outcome values while 
ignoring their ordering. In other words, a strategy generating 
individual payoffs: 4, 2, 0 for strategies          respectively, 
should be considered equally as good as a strategy generating 
payoffs 0, 2, and 4. Hence it is assumed that the preference 
model is impartial (anonymous, symmetric). More formally: 
 
                                                  (3) 
for any permutation τ of                
 
(3) Principle of transfers: The Pigou-Dalton principle of 
transfers [20] states that a transfer of any small amount from 
an outcome to any other relatively worse-off outcome results 
in a more preferred outcome vector. More formally: 
 
           
                         
                            
for 0 < ε <               .                                                (4) 
 
Thus a strategy generating all three individual payoffs 
equal to 2 is better than any strategy generating individual 
payoffs 4, 2, and 0. 
The preference relation satisfying axioms (1) - (3) is called 
equitable (Lorenz) preference relation [15]. 
The relation of equitable dominance can be expressed as a 
vector inequality on the cumulative ordered payoffs. This can 
be mathematically formalized as follows. Let us consider the 
payoffs ordered in an ascending order 
                Aaauauau n  ),(...)()( )()2()1(           (5) 
and define the quantities: 
),()( )1(1 aual  ... 
                                   .)()(
1
)(


n
i
in aual                           (6) 
Strategy a is said to Lorenz dominate strategy b (and we write 
     if and only if [1], [15]: 
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Lorenz equilibrium of the game is the set of non-dominated 
strategies with respect to relation    [1]. 
Informally, Lorenz equilibrium is the set of the most 
balanced and equitable Pareto efficient strategies. 
 
III. LORENZ EQUILIBRIUM PROPERTIES 
In GT the Lorenz dominance relation is applied to address 
some limitations of standard GT solution concepts. Both Nash 
and Pareto equilibria have limitations when applied to real 
world problems. Nash equilibrium assumes players are 
rational agents choosing their strategies as best response to 
strategies chosen by other players. NE rarely ensures maximal 
payoffs for all players – it suffers from excessive competition 
among selfish players in a non-cooperative game, and the 
outcome may be inefficient [4]. On the other hand, Pareto 
equilibrium ensures the optimal payoffs but the set of Pareto-
optimal strategies is often too large and too hard to process. 
Thus a decision making procedure is needed for selecting a 
particular Pareto optimal strategy. Moreover, payoffs of Pareto 
strategies may be highly unequal.  
However, the LE provides a small subset of Pareto efficient 
strategies that are equitable for all players. 
The advantage of the Lorenz equilibrium is that it preserves 
the qualities of Pareto equilibrium and the set of strategies is 
considerably smaller. Moreover the resulting strategies assure 
the maximal payoffs that are equitable for all players. 
Lorenz equilibrium is characterized by equitable payoffs. In 
addition to the basic objective, aiming to maximize individual 
utilities, fairness refers to the idea of favouring well-balanced 
utility profiles.  
Where multiple equilibria exist (in discrete games, for 
instance), the need for equilibrium selection arises. The main 
equilibrium selection criteria, as discussed in [4], are: Pareto 
optimality, equilibrium refinement, and evolutionary 
equilibrium. 
If multiple Nash equilibria exist in a game (e.g. discrete 
many-player game), the closest ones to the Pareto optimal are 
usually chosen. But, usually, a large set (sometimes infinite) 
of Pareto optimal strategies exists. Considering the distance to 
the Lorenz set of optimal strategies, a more specific condition 
(criterion) is introduced. The selected NE will be closest to 
Lorenz equilibrium (Pareto optimal and also equitable 
strategy). 
IV. LORENZ EQUILIBRIUM DETECTION 
An evolutionary method, based on generative relations [17], 
is used for equilibrium detection. An adaptation of the state-
of-the-art Differential Evolution [19] is the underlying 
evolutionary technique. Other choices are also possible (e.g. 
an adaptation of NSGA-II [21]). The method is robust with 
respect to the nature of the game (continuous, discrete) and 
scalable to the number of players and the number of available 
resources (channels, power levels, etc.). It allows comparison 
of strategies and payoffs of several equilibria. The complexity 
is that of the underlying evolutionary techniques (e.g. [19], 
[21]). 
In the framework of non-cooperative game theory, Lorenz 
equilibrium is defined using a generative relation based on the 
Lorenz dominance [1], [15]. 
Generative relations represent an algebraic tool for 
characterizing and detecting game equilibria [16], [17]. 
Generative relations are defined on the set of game strategies. 
The idea is that the non-dominated strategies with respect to 
the generative relation equals (or approximate) the equilibrium 
set. 
Generative relations for Nash, Pareto, and joint Nash-Pareto 
equilibria may be defined [16]. The joint Nash-Pareto and 
Pareto-Nash equilibria applied to CR interaction analysis are 
discussed in [14], [18] for different game models. 
Generative relation of Lorenz equilibrium. Let us consider 
a relation   over A × A . Strategy            means strategy 
   dominates strategy   .  
A strategy    is non dominated with respect to relation   if 
                  
Let us denote by ND   the set of non-dominated strategies 
with respect to relation  . A subset      is non-dominated 
with respect to   if and only if            . 
Relation   is said to be a generative relation for the 
equilibrium E if and only if the set of non-dominated 
strategies with respect to   equals the set E of strategies (i.e. 
     . 
Lorenz equilibrium of a game is the set of non-dominated 
strategies with respect to the    relation as defined by (7). 
Therefore we may consider    the generative relation for 
Lorenz equilibrium. 
V. OPEN SPECTRUM SHARING SCENARIO 
In order to illustrate the detection and usefulness of the 
Lorenz equilibrium, a general open spectrum access scenario 
may be considered [6], [14]. The scenario is modelled as a 
non-cooperative, one-shot game. The discrete form of the 
game is analyzed, as it exhibits multiple Nash equilibria. 
Standard game models, in their continuous form ([4], [5], [8], 
[9], [12], [13]), do not capture the discrete nature of choices 
made by CRs. Therefore, we are lead to consider the discrete 
form games.
 
The players are n CRs attempting to access a certain set of 
available channels (or whitespace) W. Each CR i is free to 
implement a number of frequency hopping channels
 Wai ,...,1,0 , where ai is a CR i individual strategy and 
|W| is the cardinality of the set W. A strategy profile is a vector 
a = (a1,...,an). Let us consider Ki to be the rate of interfered 
symbols on each channel, and let ]10,0[iK . This rate may 
also account for a range of factors that generally cause unused 
symbols (interference, noise, etc.) and it actually reflects the 
link-level performance on each channel. 
 Each CR is attempting to maximize its payoff ui given as: 
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The form of the chosen payoff function ui accounts for the 
difference between a function of goodput i
n
k
k aaW 





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1
 (a 
linear approximation of the number of non-interfered symbols 
per channel   number of frequency hopped channels) and the 
cost of simultaneously supporting ai channels: Kiai (rate of 
interfered symbols per channel   number of channels). Other 
payoff functions may be considered (e.g. the ones in [12], 
[13]), as well as asymmetric costs. 
The question for this general scenario is: how many 
simultaneous frequency hopping channels should each CR 
access in order to maximize its payoff in a stable game 
situation (equilibrium)? 
Challenges of discrete games are related to: (i) computing 
Nash equilibria, (ii) existence of multiple NEa, and (iii) 
selection of an efficient NE (close to a Pareto optimal strategy 
or to Lorenz equilibrium).
 
VI. EQUILIBRIUM DETECTION – NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS 
The effectiveness of the Lorenz equilibrium criterion for 
the Nash equilibrium selection problem becomes clear for 
many-player games (n-dimensional space). For the sake of 
accuracy and simplicity in illustrating the presence of LE, we 
have chosen to represent the two- and three-dimensional cases. 
Two and three CR simultaneous spectrum access scenarios are 
therefore considered. As the continuous modelling captures 
only partially the variety of possible equilibrium situations, 
challenging discrete instances of the game are considered. 
Lorenz equilibrium is detected and analyzed along with 
four other types of equilibria: Nash, Pareto, and the joint 
Nash-Pareto, and Pareto-Nash equilibria.  
Let us consider the following simulation parameters: 
10W  (number of available channels) and Ki = 1 (equal 
unitary rate of interfered symbols per channel). 
The reported results represent a sub-set of more extensive 
simulations. A population of 100 strategies has been evolved 
using a rank-based fitness assignment technique. In all 
experiments the process converges in less than 20 generations.  
Fig. 1 illustrates the equilibrium strategies achieved by two 
CRs simultaneously trying to access the same set of ten 
available channels ( 10W ).   
The computation of the NE strategy for the standard, 
continuous-form game – taken as a reference point – is 
straightforward and yields (3,3), the NE being unique [5]. NE 
is a stable strategy from which no CR has any incentive to 
individually deviate.  
The discrete instance of the 2-player game reveals three 
Nash equilibria: (2,4), (3,3), (4,2) and one Lorenz equilibrium: 
(2,2) (Fig. 1 and Fig. 2). For a larger number of players even 
more NEa exist and LE is also a multi-element set. 
The existence of multiple NEa indicates a certain degree of 
flexibility in choosing the number of channels to access – 
there are several situations from which the CRs have no 
incentive to unilaterally deviate.  
The (3,3) NE strategy is the most stable game situation as it 
maintains even for the joint N-P and P-N strategies (they 
overlap, Fig.1). It is also the closest one to LE (2,2). As 
expected, the corresponding payoffs – NE: (9,9) – (Fig. 2), are 
the most equitable of the three NEa. The other two NEa, (2,4) 
and (4,2), are also stable and are maintained for one of the 
joint strategies (N-P or P-N), but are not equitable: payoffs are 
(6,12) and (12,6), respectively. 
Fig. 2 illustrates the payoffs of the two players (CRs): u1(a1, 
a2) and u2(a1,a2). The three NE payoffs (6,12), (9,9), (12,6) 
offer a diversity of utilities among which one equitable 
solution: (9,9). LE payoff (10,10) is slightly higher than NE 
payoff (9,9). Yet, the corresponding number of accessed 
channels is smaller for LE: (2,2) than for NE: (3,3) . 
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 capture the equilibrium situations 
(strategies and payoffs, respectively) for the discrete 
modelling of the 3-CRs simultaneous sharing of the same set 
of channels. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Discrete modelling. – two CRs (card W=10, K=1). Evolutionary 
detected equilibrium strategies: Nash: (2,4), (3,3), (4,2) Pareto, Nash-Pareto, 
Pareto-Nash, and Lorenz: (2,2). 
 
Figure 2.  Discrete modelling – two CRs (card W=10, K=1). Payoffs of the 
evolutionary detected equilibria: Nash: (6,12), (9,9), (12,6), Pareto, N-P, P-N, 
and Lorenz: (10,10). 
Seven Nash equilibria) are detected (Fig. 3): (2,2,2), 
(2,2,3), (2,3,2), (3,2,2), (1,3,3), (3,1,3), and (3,3,1). This 
indicates an even higher flexibility in choosing the number of 
accessed channels for each CR. Also the range of available 
payoffs is increased (Fig. 4). NE payoffs are (6, 6, 6), (4, 4, 6), 
(4, 6, 4) , (6, 4, 4), (2, 6, 6), (6, 2, 6), (6, 6, 2). We may even 
notice one NE strategy (2,2,2) overlapping a LE and yielding 
identical payoffs (6,6,6). Obviously this is the preferred NE 
among the seven detected (according to the fairness criterion).  
The effectiveness of LE criterion in NE selection is even 
more evident for n-player )3( n  games. In the n-player case 
the number of NEa increases polynomially. Moreover, the 
closeness to LE can no longer be indicated by visual 
inspection. The NE that is computationally detected as closest 
to LE may then be selected. 
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Figure 3.  Three CR simultaneous access (card W=10, K=1). Discrete 
resource access modelling. Strategies: Nash: (2,2,2), (2,2,3),  (2,3,2),  (3,2,2), 
(1,3,3),  (3,1,3),  (3,3,1), Pareto, N-N-P, N-P-P, Lorenz: (2,2,2), (1,1,2), 
(1,2,1),  (2,1,1), (2,2,1), (2,1,2), (1,2,2). 
 
Figure 4.  Three CR simultaneous access (card W=10, K=1). Discrete 
resource access modelling. Payoffs: Nash: (6, 6, 6), (4, 4, 6), (4, 6, 4) , (6, 4, 
4), (2, 6, 6), (6, 2, 6), (6, 6, 2), Pareto, N-N-P, N-P-P, and Lorenz: (6, 6, 6), (5, 
5, 10), (5, 10, 5), (10, 5, 5), (8, 8, 4), (8, 4, 8),  (4, 8, 8).  
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
A new equilibrium concept for non-cooperative GT 
modelling of open spectrum sharing is considered: the Lorenz 
equilibrium. LE is a subset of Pareto optimal strategies that 
proves useful in selecting a NE when multiple ones exist (e.g. 
in many-player discrete games). LE is an appealing strategy 
concept for spectrum sharing games as it is both fair and 
profitable (usually ensures a higher payoff than NE and is 
Pareto optimal). 
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